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bstract
This paper studies the effects of business cycles on the performance of commercial bank loan portfolios across major developing economies in the
eriod 1996–2008. We measure loan performance via loan loss provisions (that is, recognized expenses related to expected losses in bank income
tatements). Our results indicate that while economic growth is the main driver of loan portfolio performance, interest rates have second-order
ffects. Furthermore, we find the relationship between loan loss provisions and economic growth to be highly non-linear only under extreme
conomic stress: GDP growth needs to decline by more than 6 percentage points (pp, in absolute terms) in order to generate an increase in loan
oss provisions equivalent to median emerging market bank profits; while a decline of more than 10 pp in growth implies significant capital losses,
f at least 20 percent, for the median emerging market bank. In addition, we find higher loan loss provisions are associated with private sector
everage, poor loan portfolio quality, and lack of banking system penetration and capitalization.
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. Introduction
Understanding bank performance gains renewed interest with
very financial crisis and the 2009 global financial crisis was no
xception. Although banks across industrialized countries cap-
ured most of the attention owing to their leading role in the
rigins of the crisis, they were not the only ones under scrutiny.
iven the increasing importance of developing countries in the
lobal economy and memories of the emerging market crises of
 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not neces-
arily represent those of the IFC, IFC Management or the World Bank Group.
ll errors and omissions are sole responsibility of the authors.
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he 1990s, regulators, analysts and investors expressed concern
bout the strength of developing world banking systems in the
ace of global recession. In the aftermath of last year’s crisis,
xcept for the particularities of foreign currency lending across
astern European countries, the banking systems across most
f the remaining major emerging economies were in general
esilient to the global downturn even though GDP growth rates in
any of these countries dropped significantly. For instance, data
rom the IMF Global Financial Stability Report (April 2010)
hows that while the level of non-performing loans (NPLs, mea-
ured as a percentage of total loans) in 2009 was more than 3.5
imes larger than the level observed in 2007 for the U.S. and
he U.K.; that ratio was less than 1.5 times larger in the case
f Brazil, China and India. Moreover, 90 percent of (reported)
eveloping economies across Asia, Latin America, Middle East
nd Africa experienced an increase in the level of NPLs in 2009
ess than two times the level in 2007.1
1 Loan performance deterioration was significantly higher across Emerging
urope. While only one quarter of countries saw their NPL ratio increasing by
ess than two times between 2007 and 2009, 60 percent of countries saw increases
etween two and ten times in that period. For a simulation model on NPLs for
merging Europe see Box 1.2 and Annex 1.6 in IMF’s Global Financial Stability
eport (April 2010).
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There are alternative explanations for recent banking per-
ormance across the developing world. One explanation points
o an underlying governing relationship between loan portfolio
erformance and the business cycle; in most countries declines
n GDP were significant though not extreme given that most
eveloping countries (except Emerging Europe) faced the indi-
ect effects of global recession rather than a domestic crisis. An
lternative explanation focuses on the importance of stronger
nstitutional frameworks reflecting past reforms and the lessons
earned from past crisis episodes. Most surely, both explana-
ions are relevant.2 However, this paper focuses on the first
xplanation by studying the effects of economic growth and
nterest rates on the performance of commercial bank loan port-
olios across major developing economies during the period
996–2008.3 Given the short time series of this sample, we
xploit cross-sectional variation in the data to characterize
n average relationship between bank loan portfolio perfor-
ance and the business cycle across the developing world.4
nderstanding these dynamics and quantifying the underly-
ng relationship between loan performance measures and key
acroeconomic indicators is of particular importance for risk
nalysis tools, including VaR (Value at Risk) and stress testing.
urthermore, such an estimate becomes critical to investors and
nalysts that do not have full access to detailed information about
he structure and historical performance of bank loan portfolios
y providing a simplified (though structured and statistically
upported) approach to modeling loan performance sensitivities
o macroeconomic scenarios and generating top-down analysis
o flag potential vulnerabilities going forward.5
There is a large literature looking at macroeconomic determi-
ants of bank loan portfolio performance. Most of these studies
re country specific, many of which are focused on particular
risis episodes with a wide coverage across the industrialized
orld. The work can be grouped into three main methodological
pproaches. First, some authors use reduced-form linear mod-
ls. Among this group Arpa et al. (2001) work with a sample of
ustrian banks, Gerlach et al. (2005) uses data from banks in
ong Kong and Quagliariello (2004) studies the case of Italy.
second group uses VAR (Vector Auto Correlation) models.
his group includes Baboucˇek and Jancˇar (2005) who work with
ata from the Czech Republic, and Hoggarth et al. (2005) for the
ase of England. A third group of studies focuses on the trans-
ission mechanisms through the impacts on default and loss
iven default. For this literature see Altman et al. (2002), Pesaran
t al. (2006), Segoviano (2006a,b); and Padilla and Segoviano
2006) for an application to stress testing. However, there is rela-
ively little research looking at emerging markets overall. Aside
rom the cross-country estimations presented in the 2003 IMF
inancial Soundness Indicators background paper and Annex
2 For an analysis of emerging markets during the 2009 financial crisis see
laudes et al. (2010).
3 The period of analysis is dictated by data availability as of December 2010.
4 We define developing economies as those classified as Low Income, Low
iddle Income and Upper Middle Income countries by the World Bank.
5 See Hoggarth et al. (2005) for details on top-down versus bottom-up stress
est frameworks.
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.6 in the 2010 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, which
resents a simulation of NPLs in Emerging European countries,
o the best of our knowledge there is no other documented char-
cterization of the relationship between loan performance and
he business cycle for developing countries. In addition, the lit-
rature discussed above usually relies on linear relationships (or
mpulse response functions from linear VAR structures) between
PLs and macroeconomic determinants such as GDP, inflation,
nterest rates or exchange rates. However, data from past banking
nd financial crisis episodes across developing countries sug-
est the possibility of non-linearity under high economic stress
closely related to the so-called tail effects in the VaR, default and
oss given default literature). Thus, the nature of the underlying
elationship between loan performance and the business cycle
emains an open question. It is worth noting that the dynamics of
his relationship imply a series of two-way causalities. It is usu-
lly the case that initially a negative (positive) economic shock
mpacts loan portfolios of diverse qualities across the banking
ystem. This is then followed by a contraction (expansion) of
redit growth by banks, which in turn affects economic growth,
ump-starting a new round of effects. Along these lines, the esti-
ates documented in this paper pretend to capture the observed
verall effects.
We test alternative models to characterize this relationship,
hich include linear and non-linear specifications at the indi-
idual bank and banking system levels. In addition, we offer an
lternative measure of loan portfolio performance through the
se of loan loss provisions. As recently stated by John C. Dugan,
.S. Comptroller of the Currency, loan loss provisioning “allows
anks to recognize an estimated loss on a loan or a portfolio of
oanswhen the loss becomes likely,well before the amount of loss
an be determined with precision and is actually charged off”.6
iven loan loss provisions are recognized expenses to increase
oan loss reserves on the balance sheet, they provide a potentially
aluable measure of bank reassessments about expected losses in
heir loan portfolio. Furthermore, while loan loss provisions and
eserves are related to an assessment on the entire loan portfolio,
ot all NPLs may generate future losses (although the assigned
robabilities of doing so are higher for these in the calcula-
ion of loan loss provisions and reserves). Section 2 describes
he data and discusses relevant issues of using loan loss provi-
ions as a measure of loan portfolio performance. We combine
ank level data from the commercial database Bankscope with
acroeconomic and banking system level data from the World
ank and the IMF. The Bankscope database contains financial
tatement information for more than 29,000 private and public
anks globally over more than 15 years. We restrict the sample
o 22 major developing economies for which there is available
nformation on a diverse and representative group of banks. This
roup of countries accounts for 85% of the developing world’s
DP, as well as more than 80% of the developing economies
ommercial banking assets available in Bankscope. The sample
6 Remarks by John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency before the Institute
f International Bankers, March 2, 2009. “Loan Loss Provisioning and Pro-
yclicality”.
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Table 1
Number of banks per country and year.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 67 65 63 62 61 65 62 57 57 56 53 55 56
Brazil 80 79 80 80 85 103 104 89 87 88 77 101 85
Chile 19 21 23 21 21 23 22 22 21 23 21 1 22
China 1 3 3 5 6 13 28 40 47 63 59 106 92
Colombia 23 22 21 19 22 22 22 24 23 19 14 13 14
Egypt 20 24 26 24 24 23 22 20 20 19 10 18 18
India 23 40 44 45 44 48 52 52 53 47 41 41 40
Indonesia 63 52 57 57 47 44 39 47 51 52 41 52 50
Malaysia 36 35 32 31 24 24 26 26 27 27 27 27 29
Mexico 7 17 20 25 25 22 23 23 24 23 22 28 29
Nigeria 36 44 44 48 48 52 47 39 26 14 16 19 17
Pakistan 9 9 11 10 9 10 11 17 19 24 23 23
Peru 17 20 20 16 15 13 12 12 12 11 10 11 13
Philippines 4 7 8 7 3 4 7 6 20 21 21 20
Poland 9 9 8 4 2 1 1 13 15 15
Romania 1 3 6 11 14 12 16 17 12 11 10 22 21
Russia 17 23 17 44 74 97 110 112 452 641 822 871 907
South Africa 5 5 4 5 6 5 3 2 11 15 13 18 18
Thailand 8 10 13 13 16 18 18 18 17 19 19 19 19
Turkey 10 12 11 22 18 18 20 22 13 11 11 25
Ukraine 5 7 6 10 17 21 20 21 14 18 20 41 41
Vietnam 3 10 8 11 16 19 16 32 35
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in this context as recognized expenses in the income statement
reflecting expected losses in the loan portfolio during the period,
in contrast to loan loss reserves accumulated in the balance sheet.ource: Bankscope (only includes banks with available financial information w
ontains more than 11,300 bank-year observations in the period
996–2008.
Our estimates in Section 4 show that economic growth is
he main driver of loan portfolio performance, while interest
ates have second-order effects. The coefficients of the linear
odel specification for GDP growth and lending interest rates
re consistent with past estimations from the IMF, as well as the
ndings of Glen (2005) on an analysis of interest coverage ratios
or non-financial companies in developing countries. In addition,
on-linear specifications in GDP growth provide the best statis-
ical fit to the data. More importantly, the average underlying
elationship implies that significant loan performance deterio-
ation only occurs under extreme economic stress. Estimations
ased on bank level data indicate that GDP needs to decline
y more than 6 percentage points (pp, in absolute terms) in
rder to generate an increase in loan loss provisions equiva-
ent to median bank profitability in the sample (as measured
y return on total assets). Similarly, a decline of more than
0 pp in the economy’s growth rate implies an exponential
ncrease in loan loss provisions. For minor economic slow-
owns the level of provisioning tends to be linear in GDP.
e also find that higher private sector indebtedness, individ-
al banks or banking system leverage (or lower capitalization)
nd accumulated loan loss reserves (a reflection of poor loan
ortfolio quality) are associated with higher levels of loan loss
rovisions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
ata; Section 3 documents stylized facts of the relationship
etween loan loss provisions, GDP growth and interest rates for
elected developing countries; Section 4 presents the estimations
nd Section 5 concludes. pcountries with available economic data).
. Sample data
We combine bank level data from the commercial database
ankscope with macroeconomic and banking system level data
rom the World Bank and the IMF. The Bankscope database
ontains detailed financial statement information for more than
9,000 private and public banks around the world over more
han 15 years. We focus on the period 1996–2008. While devel-
ping economies coverage has improved substantially over the
ears, the number of observations before 1996 is small across
ost emerging markets. On the other hand, there is a one to
wo year data collection lag. Therefore we truncate the analysis
t year 2008 in order to prevent biases in the data in favor of
arly reporting banks. We restrict the sample to 22 major devel-
ping economies for which there is available information on a
iverse and representative group of banks, as well as available
acroeconomic series. Table 1 shows the number of banks per
ountry and year included in the sample. This group of coun-
ries accounted for 85% of developing world GDP in 2006, and
ontains more than 11,300 bank-year observations representing
ore than 80% of developing economies commercial banking
ssets in Bankscope in this period.7
Our measure of loan portfolio performance is the ratio of loan
oss provisions to gross loans. Loan loss provisions are defined7 These figures include only banks with available financial information for the
eriod of analysis.
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Fig. 1. Serial correlations of loan loss provisions (as a percentage of gross loans) with GDP growth and lending rates for the period 1996–2008.
Table 2
Balance sheet size, loan portfolio size and capitalization (year 2006).
Balance sheet size
total assets
(USD billion)
Loan portfolio size
gross loans/assets
(%)
Capitalization
total equity/assets
(%)
Argentina 82.0 39.1 10.9
Brazil 741.7 37.7 9.9
Chile 113.4 71.8 8.2
China 3,366.1 51.4 5.9
Colombia 46.0 65.3 10.8
Egypt 61.3 35.2 5.7
India 657.2 58.2 5.7
Indonesia 147.9 48.5 10.5
Malaysia 296.0 55.4 7.2
Mexico 235.5 53.0 13.2
Nigeria 48.5 30.6 13.6
Pakistan 65.4 59.4 8.2
Peru 26.0 59.6 9.4
Philippines 71.9 38.5 11.2
Poland 129.4 51.1 10.5
Romania 26.2 55.5 9.7
Russia 238.7 63.4 13.3
South Africa 214.2 73.4 6.3
Thailand 228.5 71.8 8.3
Turkey 54.7 52.1 12.0
Ukraine 25.1 77.8 10.4
Vietnam 19.7 47.3 8.6
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year observations (including banks across 22 countries spanning
13 years).8 Although the panel is not fully balanced, we do not
consider this as a significant source of bias in the estimation.9otal 6,895.6
ource: Bankscope.
e chose this measure over non-performing loans (NPLs) for
wo reasons. On the one hand, the availability of NPL data in
ankscope is limited and not uniform across countries or banks.
his is due to the fact that NPLs are not a line in the financial
tatements, but are in general disclosed within the notes to the
nancial statements. On the other hand, the definition of NPLs
aries across countries and it may not be possible to access the
ata needed to make definitions consistent. Hence, even if the
ata were available, there is no guarantee in terms of consis-
ency. An alternative source of data on provisions and NPLs (by
ountry) are the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators in the sta-
istical appendix of the Global Financial Stability Report. We
se this data as a reference, but keep Bankscope as the primary
ource given the availability of bank level data. The estimations
e
b52.6 7.5
n the paper are done at the bank and country levels. Table 2
hows aggregate figures for the size of the banking system (sum
f total assets), relative size of the loan portfolio (gross loans
o total assets) and capitalization (equity to total assets) in year
006 for all countries included in the sample.
The sample consists of 11,306 bank-year and 276 country-8 Banks with Provisions to Gross Loans above 100% and below −100% were
xcluded from the sample.
9 The main results using bank level data are robust to the exclusion of Russian
anks (which account for 37% of the bank-year observation in the sample).
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cig. 2. Provisions, GDP growth and lending rates for Argentina, Russia, Turke
rovisions to gross loans and 147% lending rate). Turkey not plotted in right pa
ith regard to the main macroeconomic effects included in the
stimation, we use standard real gross domestic product growth
ates (reported by the World Bank) and lending interest rates
reported by the IMF).10 The lending rate is not only the type
f interest rate most related to commercial banking loan activ-
10 The IMF’s International Financial Statistics publication defines the Lending
ate as the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term financ-
ng needs of the private sector; which is normally differentiated according to
reditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing.
d
l
s
C
1Ukraine (1996–2008). (Russia not plotted in right panel for year 1996 (4.1%
r year 2008 due to lack of interest rate data (1.4% provisions to gross loans).)
ties, but provides us with a comprehensive time series across
ountries.11 Other macroeconomic controls include the level of
omestic credit to the private sector (a measure of private sector
everage), the level of domestic credit provided by the banking
ector (a measure of financial sector penetration) and the current
11 We completed the IMF series with data from national sources (usually
entral Banks) in some cases. These include Brazil and Vietnam for years
995–1996, as well as Pakistan and Turkey for the entire series.
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Fig. 3. Provisions, GDP growth and len
ccount balance (a measure of external leverage), all measured
s a percentage of GDP (as reported by the World Bank).12
. Stylized facts of loan loss provisions, GDP growth
nd interest rates
We now provide some statistical evidence on the relationship
etween loan portfolio performance and the business cycle. The
ntuition behind this relationship is straightforward. For any loan
ortfolio originated by a bank in the past, the performance of
hat portfolio at present and going forward is conditional on
urrent and future economic conditions. If for instance healthy
rowth in the economy goes on, the bank should not expect
bnormal deterioration in their loan portfolio performance, but
aybe some early or partial repayments within their customer
ase. However, if economic conditions deteriorate sufficiently
rms may not be able to service their debt given lower rev-
nues, while individuals affected by unemployment may stop
aying their (credit card, auto or student loan, mortgage) bills
nce their savings are exhausted. On the other hand, interest rate
ikes may affect the ability of firms or individuals to continue
ervicing their debt. The left panel of Fig. 1 shows the serial cor-
elation between loan loss provisions and GDP growth for the
eriod 1996–2008, and the right panel shows the serial correla-
ion between provisions and lending rates. For most countries the
orrelation of loan loss provisions with GDP growth is negative
except for Egypt) and the correlation with lending rates is pos-
tive (except for Chile, China, Egypt and Vietnam). In addition,
here is significant variation across countries.
12 As of January 2011, year 2009 official figures for these measures were not
vailable.
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aates for China and Egypt (1996–2008).
We explore this heterogeneity by looking at the experience of
select group of countries during the period of analysis. Fig. 2
hows the level of provisions relative to GDP growth and lending
ates for Argentina, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. These coun-
ries experienced at least one crisis episode during 1996–2008,
s reported in Laeven and Valencia (2008). Loan loss provisions
n these countries increase significantly and spike around the
eported year of the crisis (Argentina in 2001, Russia in 1998,
urkey in 2000 and Ukraine in 1998). Also note that in all cases
rovisions tend to remain at stable levels for all other years
espite sizable differences in the pace of economic growth. Fur-
hermore, the data in all these cases clearly suggest a negative
elationship between provisions and GDP growth and a positive
elationship with lending rates. However, the observed change in
rovisions relative to these macroeconomic variables differs sig-
ificantly across countries. For instance, while Argentine banks
ad 11.2% loan loss provisions under −10.9% GDP growth and
1.7% interest rates in 2002, Turkish banks had a similar lev-
ls of provisions (11%) in 1998 with −5.7% GDP growth and
8.8% interest rates. In contrast, Russian banks experienced
ilder increases in loan loss provisions (up to 5.0%) during
he 1998 crisis, despite experiencing −5.3% GDP growth and
1.8% interest rates.
Fig. 3, on the other hand, shows the level of provisions rel-
tive to GDP growth and lending rates for China and Egypt.
ecall that these countries were exception cases in the analysis
f serial correlations described in Fig. 1. Furthermore, these two
ountries did not have a banking crisis episode in the period of
nalysis (as reported by Laeven and Valencia, 2008). The pat-
erns in Fig. 3 show no clear relationship between provisions and
DP growth or interest rates. While loan loss provisions main-
ain a stable level in all years, GDP growth is always positive
nd interest rates vary in a limited range. Hence, these countries
1 of De
d
a
a
F
G
i
t
e
m
a
t
o
r
y
M
c
s
a
d
c
d
4
o
s
P
w
r
i
l
v
e
a
T
a
a
4
w
b
T
i
s
e
t
a
f
t
i
P
c
d
c
i
t
l
e
o
i
(
t
o
o
t
s
t
(
c
P
o
b
m
P
s
m
a
c
i
t
l
t
(
P
The importance of banking system characteristics is implied
256 J. Glen, C. Mondragón-Vélez / Review
id not experience enough economic stress during the period of
nalysis to see a significant deterioration in loan performance
nd thus tend to behave as the group of countries presented in
ig. 2 do during no crisis times (detailed figures for provisions,
DP growth rates and lending interest rate levels for all countries
n the sample are provided in Appendix A).
The evidence presented in this section highlights impor-
ant differences with regard to the magnitude of business cycle
ffects across countries. While the estimation in Section 4
ay not fully explain this heterogeneity, it intends to char-
cterize the dynamics of loan portfolio performance along
he business cycle in emerging markets, as an initial step in
ur understanding of this phenomena going forward. In this
egard, countries with crisis episodes during the period of anal-
sis (which include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia,
alaysia, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine)
ontribute their loan performance variation under business cycle
hocks; while the remaining countries act as a control for vari-
tions across non crisis times. Therefore, we should expect a
ifferentiated relationship between provisions and the business
ycle under significant economic stress than under mild slow-
owns or continued growth times.
. Estimation
As mentioned before, we generate estimates using a sample
f individual banks, as well as a sample of country banking
ystems. The relationship we estimate is of the general form:
rov NLoant = F (GDPct, INTct, B
-
t ,M
-
ct)
here Prov NLoant is the loan loss provisions to gross loans
atio for individual banks or banking systems at time t; GDPct
s the growth rate of GDP for country c at time t; INTct is the
ending interest rate within country c at time t; Bt is a set of
ariables describing characteristics of individual banks or the
ntire banking system; and Mc,t is a set of macroeconomic vari-
bles describing other dimensions of the economy over time.13
he functional form of F, as well as the specific set of vari-
bles included in B and M is unknown. Therefore, we explore
lternative specifications with each of the samples.
.1. Estimations using country level data
We begin by presenting estimations at the country level,
hich provide a more balanced sample over time by avoiding
ias due to over-sampling of banks within certain countries (see
able 1) and measure business cycle effects over the entire bank-
ng system. However, this comes at the cost of reducing sample
ize and underlying data variation. Country level ratios are gen-
rated as weighted averages rather than medians or means of
he corresponding sample of individual banks, so as to reflect
ggregate banking system characteristics.
13 We use the change in lending rates rather than the level, in order to control
or differences in underlying inflation levels across developing countries during
he period of analysis.
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The first specification we test is a parsimonious linear model
n GDP growth and lending rates, including one-period lags14:
rov NLoanc,t = a + BGDPc,t + B1GDPc,t−1 + γINTc,t
+ γ1R INTc,t−1 + ξt (1)
The estimates for this specification are included in the first
olumn of Table 3 (all specifications were run with robust stan-
ard errors). GDP effects are negative as expected. While the
ontemporaneous GDP effect is significant, the lagged effect
s not statistically significant. Similarly, interest rates are posi-
ive; and while the effect of the contemporaneous change in the
ending rate (INT) is significant, the lagged (real) lending rate
ffect is not statistically significant. In addition, note that in terms
f economic significance the effect of GDP growth (−0.408)
s more than ten times larger than that of interest rates INT
+0.0328). This is consistent with the findings documented in
he 2003 IMF Financial Soundness Indicators background paper
n a global sample of countries, as well as with Glen (2005)
n an analysis of interest coverage ratios for non-financial sec-
or firms across developing countries. The statistical fit of this
pecification is relatively low (R2 = 0.28). A second specifica-
ion (reported in column 2 of Table 3) includes macroeconomic
M) controls: current account to GDP ratio (CA/GDP), domestic
redit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (DomCred-
riv/GDP), domestic credit provided by banks as a percentage
f GDP (DomCredProv by Banks/GDP) and development stage
y income group dummies (as defined by the World Bank): low
iddle (LMI) and upper middle income (UMI).
rov NLoanc,t = α + BGDPc,t + B1GDPc,t−1 + γINTc,t
+ γ1R INTc,t−1 + M
-
c,t + ξt (2)
The estimates for GDP and INT related variables under this
pecification are similar to those in (1), without much improve-
ent in overall fit (R2 = 0.31). With the exception of CA/GDP
nd the UMI dummy, none of the remaining macroeconomic
ovariates is statistically significant. The next model (reported
n the third column of Table 3) includes banking system charac-
eristics (B) in addition to macroeconomic variables (M): loan
oss reserves to gross loans (LoanLossRes/GLoan), gross loans
o total assets (GLoan/Total Assets) and total equity to total assets
Equity/Total Assets) ratios.
rov NLoanc,t = α + BGDPc,t + B1GDPc,t−1 + γINTc,t
+ γ1R INTc,t−1 + M
-
c,t + B
-
c,t + ξt (3)y the increase in overall fit (R = 0.54). There are also notable
hanges across some covariates under this specification. The
14 We consider the real lending rate (R INT = INT – CPI Inﬂation) as the lagged
nterest rate effect, rather than last year’s change in lending rates. In this way we
easure the additional effect of a change in interest rates coming from a low or
igh real interest rate environment at the beginning of the period.
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Table 3
Provisions to gross loans regressions on GDP and lending rates at the banking system level.
Linear models with no
fixed effectsa
Linear model with
country fixed effectsb
Polynomial model including
country fixed effectsb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPt −0.4084**
(0.19)
−0.4262**
(0.193)
−0.2831***
(0.088)
−0.2206***
(0.075)
−0.4019***
(0.107)
−0.3441***
(0.107)
GDPt2 −0.0337*
(0.02)
GDPt3 0.0045**
(0.0021)
0.0059**
(0.0024)
GDPt4 0.0004**
(0.0002)
GDPt5 −0.00002*
(0.00001)
−0.00004***
(0.00001)
GDPt−1 −0.1682
(0.168)
−0.1708
(0.158)
−0.0694
(0.101)
−0.0324
(0.069)
−0.0394
(0.071)
−0.0789
(0.061)
INTt 0.0328**
(0.014)
0.0375**
(0.015)
0.0297**
(0.013)
0.0303**
(0.014)
0.0306**
(0.014)
0.0319**
(0.014)
REALINTt−1 0.0140
(0.011)
0.0178
(0.012)
0.0189
(0.013)
0.0212
(0.014)
0.0205
(0.013)
0.0205
(0.015)
CA/GDP 0.0571**
(0.029)
−0.0031
(0.023)
0.051*
(0.03)
0.0575*
(0.03)
0.0311
(0.033)
DomCredPriv/GDP 0.0004
(0.014)
0.0173
(0.011)
0.085***
(0.024)
0.0783***
(0.025)
0.0687***
(0.026)
DomCredProv by Banks/GDP −0.0042
(0.012)
−0.0182**
(0.009)
−0.0425**
(0.018)
−0.0383**
(0.019)
−0.0338**
(0.016)
LMI dummy 0.1478
(0.267)
1.0459**
(0.52)
−0.0985
(0.786)
−0.0281
(0.756)
0.0061
(0.677)
UMI dummy −0.7118*
(0.396)
0.968*
(0.519)
−0.6061
(0.869)
−0.4734
(0.846)
−0.4995
(0.801)
LoanLossRes/loans 0.2854***
(0.081)
0.4877***
(0.108)
0.4752***
(0.109)
0.4061***
(0.137)
Gloans/total assets −0.0096
(0.02)
−0.0062
(0.027)
−0.0026
(0.026)
−0.0132
(0.023)
Equity/total assets −0.2122**
(0.097)
−0.2037***
(0.067)
−0.1947***
(0.065)
−0.1248*
(0.07)
Constant term 4.9759***
(0.908)
5.4203***
(0.959)
3.9362***
(1.318)
2.5892
(1.768)
2.1702
(1.833)
2.4843
(1.777)
No. observations 276 276 276 276 276 276
R2 0.28 0.31 0.54 0.68 0.69 0.71
a Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 1%, **p < 5%, and *p < 10%.
b Country dummy coefficients not reported.
1 of De
c
c
r
c
o
P
i
m
W
r
l
t
t
t
s
b
(
W
F
(
e
n
i
R
P
t
n
o
D
L
a
t
d
t
c
l
i
P
t
e
s
S
r
t
t
s
t
o
W
t
i
M
c
g
s
+
p
L
T
b
e
I
s
a
t
l
l
G
s
4
f
s
i
t
T
T
b
a
b
o
f
e
a58 J. Glen, C. Mondragón-Vélez / Review
ontemporaneous GDP coefficient is now statistically signifi-
ant at 1% but reduces its magnitude (to −0.28), while INT
emains significant at 5% and reduces its economic signifi-
ance as well (to +0.0297). However, the relative magnitude
f GDP to interest rate effects is maintained. DomCred-
rov by Banks/GDP (a measure of banking sector penetration)
s negative and significant, as well as the LMI and UMI dum-
ies (positive and significant at 5% and 10%, respectively).15
ith regard to banking system variables (B), larger loan loss
eserves are associated with higher provisions. Given that loan
oss reserves reflect loan portfolio quality, this result suggests
hat the lower the quality of the loan portfolio banks start with,
he higher their vulnerability to business cycle effects. The nega-
ive (and significant) effect of Equity/Total Assets on provisions
uggests that banking system capitalization is a barrier against
usiness cycle vulnerability, as expected. GLoan/Total Assets
a measure of loan portfolio size) is not statistically significant.
e test for country and time fixed effects using specification (3).
or this purpose, we use a standard F test to compare the robust
including fixed effects) and simple OLS (not including fixed
ffects) models. We find evidence of country fixed effects but
ot of time fixed effects. Hence, we run an additional linear spec-
fication including country fixed effects (Fc), which increases the
2 to 0.68 (estimates reported in column 4 of Table 3).16
rov NLoanct = α + BGDPct + B1GDPct−1 + γINTct
+ γ1R INTct−1 + M
-
ct + B
-
ct + F
-
c + ξt (4)
Under specification (4) the coefficient of GDP growth falls
o −0.22. INT remains around 0.03, while their lags continue
ot to be significant.17 While DomCredPriv/GDP (a measure
f private sector leverage) is positive and highly significant,
omCredProv by Banks/GDP is negative and significant at 5%.
oanLossRes/Loans and Equity/Total Assets preserve their signs
nd significance levels (with the former coefficient increasing
o +0.49, from +0.28 in specification (3)). Development stage
ummies are now negative and not significant.
Although the sign and significance of GDP growth is consis-
ent across linear specifications (1) through (4), the individual
ountry facts presented in Section 2 suggest there might be non-
inear effects. Therefore, we estimate additional models that
nclude a 5th order polynomial in GDP:
rov NLoanct = α + BGDPct + B2GDP2ct + B3GDP3ct
+B4GDP4ct + B5GDP5ct + B1GDPct−1
+ γINTct + γ1R INTct−1 + M
-
ct + B
-
ct
+F
-
c + ξt (5)
15 The results on banking sector penetration and development stage are related
o the findings of Loayza and Rancière (2006).
16 F tests run on non-linear specifications also show evidence of country fixed
ffects, but not of time fixed effects.
17 The order of magnitude of GDP growth and lending rate coefficients under
pecification (4) is consistent with the findings of the 2003 IMF Financial
oundness Indicators background paper and Glen (2005).
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We run a constrained and unconstrained version of (5) and
eport the results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3, respec-
ively. The constrained specification assumes B2 = B4 = 0, so as
o include only the terms of the polynomial that preserve the
ign of GDP. The main results of the unconstrained specifica-
ion are in general robust to the constrained model. Thus, we
nly comment on the estimates of the unconstrained model.
hile the overall statistical fit does not improve much from
he linear specification (R2 = 0.71 relative to 0.68 under spec-
fication (4)), all polynomial terms are statistically significant.
oreover, the change in signs from the 2nd to the 5th order
oefficients implies offsetting effects for some range of GDP
rowth rates. Lending interest rate effects remain positive and
ignificant, and preserve their second-order magnitude (around
0.03). DomCredPriv/GDP and DomCredProv by Banks/GDP
reserve their signs, order of magnitude and significance. The
MI and UMI dummies change sign and remain not significant.
he effect of loan loss reserves on loan performance continues to
e positive while that of capitalization remains negative. How-
ver, both show lower magnitudes relative to specification (4).
n sum, country level estimations suggest negative and highly
ignificant effects of economic growth on loan performance,
nd positive though second-order interest rate effects. In addi-
ion, high private sector leverage, poor loan portfolio quality and
ow banking system capitalization are associated with higher
evels of loan loss provisions. On the other hand, non-linear
DP effects do not seem economically important at the banking
ystem level.
.2. Estimations using bank level data
We now present individual bank level estimations, which
ully exploit the variation in the data and increase the sample size
ignificantly. However, this comes at the cost of larger volatility
n the estimates as well as potential bias due to the structure of
he sample in terms of number of banks per country-year (see
able 1 and footnote 9).
We follow the same identification strategy as in Section 4.1.
able 4 shows the results of specifications (1) through (6) using
ank level data; including standard errors clustered by country
nd year. The main results documented in Section 4.1 at the
anking system level hold for individual banks, although the
verall statistical fit is much lower for the latter (R2 ranging
rom 0.08 to 0.24 across specifications (1)–(6)): GDP growth
ffects are negative and strongly significant; interest rate effects
re positive, second-order and not consistently significant; pri-
ate sector leverage (as measured by DomCredPriv/GDP) is
ssociated with higher loan loss provisions, while increasing
epth of the banking system (as measured by DomCred-
rov by Banks/GDP) reduces provisions (although the effect
s statistically significant only in the unconstrained non-linear
pecification); poor loan portfolio quality (as measured by Loan-
ossRes/Loans) is associated with higher provisioning, whilencreased capitalization is associated with lower levels of pro-
isions. In addition, bank level estimations show a positive and
ignificant effect (under specifications (4) and (5)) of CA/GDP
a measure of external leverage), and a positive (though second-
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Table 4
Provisions to gross loans regressions on GDP and lending rates at the individual bank level.
Linear models with no
fixed effectsa
Linear model with
country fixed effectsb
Polynomial model including
country fixed effectsb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPt −0.4614***
(0.167)
−0.4779***
(0.167)
−0.3758***
(0.125)
−0.4006***
(0.106)
−0.4678***
(0.14)
−0.2202***
(0.081)
GDPt2 0.0111
(0.015)
GDPt3 0.0025
(0.0024)
−0.0013
(0.0015)
GDPt4 0.0002***
(0.0001)
GDPt5 −0.00002
(0.00001)
−0.00001
(0.00001)
GDPt−1 −0.0140
(0.077)
−0.034
(0.065)
0.0565
(0.058)
0.0136
(0.048)
0.0155
(0.046)
−0.0267
(0.036)
INTt 0.0148
(0.013)
0.0222*
(0.013)
0.0199*
(0.011)
0.0136
(0.012)
0.0145
(0.012)
0.0086
(0.007)
REALINTt−1 0.0254***
(0.008)
0.0366***
(0.008)
0.0397***
(0.008)
0.032**
(0.013)
0.0333**
(0.013)
0.0264***
(0.007)
CA/GDP 0.0566**
(0.027)
0.0317
(0.023)
0.0936**
(0.041)
0.0986**
(0.041)
−0.0065
(0.019)
DomCredPriv/GDP DomCredProv by 0.0088
(0.012)
0.0062
(0.01)
0.0571***
(0.022)
0.0518***
(0.019)
0.0343***
(0.011)
Banks/GDP −0.0087
(0.009)
−0.0075
(0.009)
−0.0228
(0.018)
−0.0206
(0.017)
−0.0297***
(0.009)
LMI dummy 0.1813
(0.29)
0.4313
(0.341)
1.2799*
(0.756)
1.262*
(0.703)
0.4339
(0.344)
UMI dummy −0.1141
(0.417)
0.3331
(0.357)
0.8388
(0.863)
0.912
(0.815)
0.0352
(0.43)
Loan los s res/loans 0.2311***
(0.04)
0.2365***
(0.042)
0.2354***
(0.042)
0.2252***
(0.039)
Gloans/total assets 0.0235***
(0.007)
0.0242***
(0.007)
0.0245***
(0.007)
0.0232***
(0.007)
Equity/total assets −0.0414**
(0.017)
−0.04**
(0.016)
−0.0397***
(0.015)
−0.0353**
(0.014)
Constant term 4.6859***
(0.752)
4.648***
(0.751)
1.1756*
(0.613)
1.1488
(1.254)
0.9198
(1.264)
1.1074
(0.758)
No. observations 11,306 11,306 11,306 11,306 11,306 11,306
R2 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24
a Standard errors clustered by country and year in parentheses ***p < 1%, **p < 5%, and *p < 10%.
b Country dummy coefficients not reported.
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rder) relationship between bank relative loan portfolio size and
oan loss provisions.
Linear GDP effects are larger at the individual bank than at
he banking system level; a natural consequence of individual
ank data aggregation. Lending rate coefficients are positive
nd of second-order magnitude, although statistical significance
s not fully consistent with banking system estimates. While
INT is weakly significant only under specifications (2) and
3), the effect of R INT is significant across all specifications
or individual banks. In addition, we found no evidence of fixed
ountry or time effects when using the individual bank level
ample under the linear or non-linear specifications.18
With regard to the non-linear specifications, the uncon-
trained non-linear model (specification (6) in Table 4) shows
trong statistical significance only for the fourth order term in
he polynomial and weak significance for the fifth order term.
owever, an F test on the joint significance of high-order terms
upports the non-linear specification.19
.3. Comparing linear and non-linear estimations
Overall, individual bank level estimations support the main
esults at the banking system level. In short, these estimations
uggest that GDP growth is a key driver of loan portfolio per-
ormance. However, the magnitude of GDP growth coefficients
iffers significantly across specifications and samples. Thus, this
ection provides a comparison of the relationship between loan
oss provisions and GDP growth suggested by the (linear and
on-linear) estimations using banking system and individual
ank level data presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Fig. 4 summarizes the effects of an absolute (percentage)
hange in the growth rate of GDP at the banking system (left
anel) and individual bank (right panel) levels according to
he last three specifications reported in Tables 3 and 4 (linear
odel, constrained non-linear model and full 5th order poly-
omial model). First, note that for both samples the non-linear
onstrained specification generates a similar profile to that of the
inear model. However, the magnitude of the linear effect differs
cross samples. For instance, if GDP growth declines from 6% in
ear t− 1 to −2% the next year (that is, by 8 percentage points),
oan loss provisions would increase by more than 3 percentage
oints (pp) for individual banks and around 1.75 pp at the bank-
ng system level. In other words, assuming the average bank in
specific country had a ratio of provisions to gross loans of 4%
nd the overall banking system had a ratio of 2% in year t; the lin-
ar model predicts loan loss provisions (as a percentage of total
oans) will increase to 7% for the average bank and to less than
% for the entire banking system. As expected, business cycle
hocks to individual banks are larger than those observed across
anking systems (maintaining other bank characteristics equal).
18 The results of F tests for country fixed effects are supported by the observed
2 across specifications (3) and (4).
19 The corresponding F tests run on the constrained non-linear model (specifi-
ation 5 in Table 4) do not support the joint statistical significance of high-order
erms.
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On the other hand, the unconstrained non-linear model shows
relatively flat profile across both samples for changes in GDP
rowth above −6 pp, and predicts larger effects than those sug-
ested by the linear model only for changes in GDP growth
elow −8 pp (at the individual bank level) and −10 pp (at the
anking system level). Hence, loan loss provisions are rela-
ively linear over the business cycle for GDP fluctuations of
ess than 6 pp; and will only show exponential deterioration for
eclines in GDP growth of more than 8 pp. Also note that the
nconstrained non-linear profile remains relatively flat for large
ositive GDP fluctuations across samples. These results suggest
hat on average loan portfolio performance across major emerg-
ng markets attains abnormal deterioration only under extreme
conomic stress.
There is an important caveat associated with the non-linear
odel. Driven by the small number of episodes with large GDP
ontractions in the period of analysis, confidence bands tend to
iden at extreme GDP growth rate reductions. Therefore, we
ompute bootstrapped confidence bands for the unconstrained
on-linear specification across both samples (reported in column
of Tables 3 and 4).20 The left panel of Fig. 5, which corresponds
o the unconstrained non-linear estimation at the banking system
evel, confirms the flatness of the profile for mild fluctuations of
DP growth but provides little support to non-linearity for large
conomic contractions. The bootstrap estimation at the individ-
al bank level (right panel of Fig. 5) also confirms the flatness of
he profile under mild business cycle fluctuations, and provides
ome evidence in favor of non-linearity under high economic
tress. Note that provisions decrease when the economy expands
cross both samples. In addition, the bootstrap confidence bands
uggest that provisions at the individual bank level tend to always
ncrease under economic contraction. This is not necessarily the
ase at the banking system level, where the profile tends to be
atter and confidence bands wider for negative changes in GDP
rowth.
.4. Benchmarking the linear and non-linear models
The results presented above suggest provisions are relatively
nelastic to mild year-on-year fluctuations of GDP growth of as
uch as 6 percentage points. On the other hand, overshooting in
oan performance deterioration may occur for year-on-year GDP
ontractions above 8% to 10%. Along these lines, the resilience
f the banking sector across most major emerging markets dur-
ng the past financial crisis comes as no surprise. According
o GDP growth and loan loss provision figures for years 2008
nd 2009 documented in Appendix A, only three countries in the
ample saw a double-digit economic contraction during the 2009
lobal financial crisis: Romania (−17.9 pp), Russia (−13.1 pp)
nd Ukraine (−17.2 pp); and not surprisingly, these same coun-
ries had the largest increase in loan loss provisions (above
20 The confidence bands shown in Fig. 5 correspond to the 5th and 95th per-
entiles of the distribution of point estimates at a pre-defined grid of (changes in)
DP growth rates, generated through a bootstrap procedure of 1000 replications
f full size random samples (with replacement).
J. Glen, C. Mondragón-Vélez / Review of Development Finance 1 (2011) 150–165 161
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 121086420
Change in Provisions      
(% Gross Loans)
Change in GDP Growth (%)
Esmaon at the Individual Bank Level
Linear model with country eﬀects (4)
5th polynomial -odd terms only (5)
5th polynomial in GDP (6)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 121086420
Change in Provisions      
(% Gross Loans)
Change in GDP Growth (%)
Esmaon at the Banking System Level 
Linear model with country eﬀects (4)
5th polynomial -odd terms only (5)
5th polynomial in GDP (6)
Fig. 4. Estimated effects of GDP growth on loan loss provisions.
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Fig. 5. Bootstrap confidence bands for
.8 pp) during the crisis. Furthermore, Fig. 6 compares the actual
hange in loan loss provisions observed during the 2009 global
nancial crisis, with the linear (left panel) and non-linear (right
anel) estimations at the banking system level (based only on
bserved GDP fluctuations). The linear model slightly over-
stimates the effect for countries that experienced mild business
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nconstrained non-linear specification.
ycle fluctuations, but generates an estimate with a similar order
f magnitude for two out of the three countries that experienced
ignificant economic stress. The non-linear model on the other
and, does a better job for most of the countries experiencing
ild fluctuations, but shows extreme over-shooting in the case of
ussia, Romania and Ukraine (with predicted changes in loan
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in banking system loan loss provisions.
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Table 5
Median gross loans to total assets, return on assets and equity to total assets.
1996 1997 1998 1996 2000 2001 20002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 1996–2009
Gross loans to total assets (%)
Low income 53.9 50.0 47.8 42.8 43.5 44.5 44.8 46.5 49.2 51.5 53.6 54.3 56.7 55.6 49.8
Low middle income 53.5 53.2 54.9 50.5 52.1 51.3 52.3 53.8 57.8 58.1 59.1 61.0 61.9 61.0 57.5
Upper middle income 56.9 56.7 56.9 54.4 52.4 55.9 49.6 52.6 51.3 53.1 53.5 55.0 57.3 55.5 54.7
Developing countries 55.3 53.7 53.4 49.5 49.4 49.9 49.3 50.6 53.5 56.1 57.6 58.6 60.0 58.2 55.1
ROA (%)
Low income 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4
Low middle income 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 10 1.2
Upper middle income 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1
Developing countries 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2
Total equity to total assets (%)
Low income 8.9 8.9 8.7 9.8 9.3 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.2 10.5 10.4 10.4 11.2 10.9 10.1
Low middle income 10.6 10.9 12.2 12.3 12.1 12.2 12.3 11.9 14.1 13.6 13.6 13.2 13.3 11.9 12.9
U 12.3
D 11.8
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−pper middle income 9.9 9.6 9.9 10.4 10.4 11.3
eveloping countries 10.0 9.9 10.2 10.8 10.9 11.2
oss provisions above 60 pp for the latter two). This issue is
losely related to the wide confidence bands for extreme eco-
omic deterioration documented in Section 4.3, in addition to
he particularities of foreign currency lending (not captured in
he models) across Emerging Europe.
Up to now we have presented our estimates in terms of
xpected changes in loan loss provisions; but what do these mean
n terms of profitability and capitalization losses? To answer this
uestion, we use a simple approximation and historical data to
enerate a measure of the estimated effects on loan loss pro-
isions relative to total assets; so as to make these comparable
o standard measures of profitability and capitalization such as
eturns to total assets (ROA) and total equity to total assets,
espectively.
We use financial ratios from a broad sample containing more
han 19,500 bank-year observations across emerging markets,
vailable from Bankscope for years 1996–2009. The top panel
f Table 5 shows the median size of the loan portfolio relative
o that of the balance sheet (as measured by the ratio of gross
oans to total assets) across developing country groups (low, low
iddle and upper middle income, as defined by the World Bank)
or the period 1996–2009. The medium panel shows median
rofitability (as measured by return on assets, ROA); and the
ottom panel shows median capitalization (as measured by the
atio of total equity to total assets). While the relative size of the
oan portfolio varies between 50% and 60% during the period of
nalysis (with an overall median of 55%), ROA varies between
l
e
t
i
able 6
stimated effects on loan loss provisions to total assets.
ear on year change in GDP
rowth (%)
Estimated change in loan loss
provisions (% total assets)
Esti
prov
Linear model Non-linear model Lin
−4.0 0.9 0.7 72
−6.0 1.3 1.3 108
−8.0 1.8 2.4 144
10.0 2.2 4.2 179
12.0 2.6 7.2 21512.1 11.1 10.6 10.5 9.6 9.6 10.5 10.5
11.4 12.2 12.2 12.4 12.0 12.1 11.2 11.5
.00% and 1.35% for most years; and equity is around 10% to
2% of total assets.
The estimated change in loan loss provisions (measured as
percentage of gross loans) documented in Sections 4.1–4.3 is
xpressed as follows:(
Prov
GLoans
)
t,t+1
=
(
Provt+1
GLoanst+1
)
−
(
Provt
GLoanst
)
Assuming that balance sheet structure remains around the
istorical median,
Gloanst+1
T.Assetst+1
∼= Gloanst
T.Assetst
∼= median
(
Gloans
T.Assets
)
We can express the change in loan loss provisions (measured
s a percentage of total assets) as:(
Prov
T.Assets
)
∼=
(
Provt+1
T.Assetst+1
)
×
(
GLoanst+1
T.Assetst+1
)
−
(
Prov
GLoanst
)
×
(
GLoanst
T.Assetst
)
Table 6 applies this expression to compute the approximate
hange in loan loss provisions in terms of total assets, for various
evels of GDP fluctuations using the estimated individual bank
ffects presented in Section 4.2; and compares these to the his-
orical median profitability and capitalization figures presented
n Table 5. The results show that a 6% drop in GDP growth
mated change in loan loss
isions (% net income)
Estimated change in loan loss
provisions (% total equity)
ear model Non-linear model Linear model Non-linear model
54 8 6
105 11 11
192 15 20
341 19 36
588 23 63
of De
g
m
a
t
o
c
5
c
m
c
u
a
g
m
w
fi
fi
s
f
m
e
u
c
G
a
h
a
e
c
o
t
l
s
b
t
c
b
i
i
d
o
i
o
e
i
t
s
r
a
e
u
a
A
T
L
A
B
C
C
C
E
I
I
M
M
N
P
P
P
P
R
R
S
T
T
U
V
SJ. Glen, C. Mondragón-Vélez / Review
enerates an increase in loan loss provisions equivalent to the
edian net income across emerging market banks, and consume
bout 10% of the median emerging market bank’s capital. On
he other hand, a contraction in the growth rate of GDP of 10%
r more implies sizable losses for the median bank, which would
onsume at least one fifth of its capital.
. Conclusions
This paper uses bank level and macroeconomic data to
haracterize the relationship between bank loan portfolio perfor-
ance (measured through loan loss provisions) and the business
ycle (measured mainly through GDP growth and lending rates),
sing a sample from major developing economies. We use linear
s well as non-linear specifications across banking system aggre-
ates and individual bank level data. Our results show that the
ain business cycle driver of loan performance is GDP growth,
hile interest rates have second-order effects. In addition, we
nd non-linear specifications in GDP to have a slightly better
t to the underlying data. Furthermore, the non-linear relation-
hip implies that only extreme economic stress (GDP growth
alling by more than 10 pp) can generate exponential loan perfor-
ance deterioration. Moreover, the evidence supports non-linear
ffects under extreme economic contractions more for individ-
al banks than at the banking system level (which show wide
onfidence bands for large contractions in the growth rate of
DP). In addition, while higher banking system capitalization
nd penetration are positively correlated with loan performance,
igh private sector leverage and poor loan portfolio quality are
ssociated with higher loan loss provisions.
When comparing the banking system estimates with major
merging markets performance during the 2009 global finan-
a
able A1
oan loss provisions to gross loans (%).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20
rgentina 4.1 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.4 4.0 11
razil 6.2 4.6 6.5 6.2 2.2 2.8 4
hile 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.7 0.9 1.1 1
hina 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.6 0
olombia 2.2 2.3 3.3 5.1 3.6 2.1 1
gypt 3.0 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.1 1
ndia 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.7 1
ndonesia 0.2 1.9 41.0 36.1 2.4 3.8 1
alaysia 0.6 2.0 3.8 2.4 1.5 2.0 1
exico 1.6 2.5 2.4 10.1 1.8 2.4 2
igeria 1.6 1.4 3.4 5.4 3.6 4.5 3
akistan 3.1 0.6 3.1 1.5 1.6 1.5 2
eru 2.5 2.8 2.7 3.6 3.1 2.4 2
hilippines 0.6 1.1 3.8 3.2 1.8 1.1 1
oland 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.6 1.2 3.1
omania 1.6 7.7 12.6 5.6 4.2 2.3 0
ussia 4.1 2.7 5.0 1.9 0.4 0.8 1
outh Africa 1.1 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.4 4
hailand 1.6 4.7 6.2 7.4 0.4 −0.3 1
urkey 1.7 3.2 0.8 2.1 1.6 11.0 1
kraine 1.7 6.0 14.6 2.2 3.8 2.9 1
ietnam 3.4 3.0 1
ource: Bankscope.velopment Finance 1 (2011) 150–165 163
ial crisis, we find that the linear specification tends to slightly
ver-estimate the effects for countries with mild economic fluc-
uations, but generates a similar order of magnitude for loan
oss provisions observed in economies under high economic
tress. On the other hand, the non-linear specification provides
etter estimates for countries with mild fluctuations, but tends
o overshoot for countries that experienced extreme economic
ontraction. Finally, we use historical banking ratios across a
roader sample of emerging markets to frame our results for
ndividual banks relative to standard measures of banking prof-
tability and capitalization. We find that while a (year-on-year)
rop in economic growth of 6% is equivalent to the profitability
f the median emerging market bank, a drop of 10% (or more)
mplies significant losses that would consume at least one fifth
f the median bank’s capital.
Given the increasing role of emerging markets in the global
conomy, understanding the dynamics of the banking sector
n the developing world is important. In this regard, addi-
ional research along the lines of simplified approaches to
upport the development of top-down bank stress testing and
isk analysis frameworks in these countries is critical as these
pproaches complement more comprehensive (bottom-up) mod-
ls that require detailed knowledge and information about the
nderlying loan portfolios of banks, which are not always avail-
ble to investors and analysts worldwide.
ppendix A. Provisions to gross loans, real GDP growth
nd lending interest rates
Tables A1–A3.
002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
.2 −0.9 −0.3 −0.4 −0.4 1.0 1.6 2.1
.0 3.3 2.9 3.7 4.5 3.6 3.8 4.8
.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 7.9 1.4 1.8
.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.5
.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.5 3.1 4.0 4.4
.1 1.7 2.3 4.2 3.9 2.2 4.9 0.7
.8 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
.7 1.7 0.9 1.1 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.0
.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7
.0 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.1 3.4 5.4 5.1
.8 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 8.1 7.2
.3 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.8 2.0 2.6 2.3
.1 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7
.3 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.9
0.4 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 2.0
.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.6 1.3 3.1
.3 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.8 1.4 2.1 5.8
.5 1.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.8
.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.3 1.7 1.0 0.9
.9 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.2
.6 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.2 4.4 10.1
.2 1.0 0.8 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.4 0.5
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Table A2
Real GDP growth (%).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Argentina 5.5 8.1 3.9 −3.4 −0.8 −4.4 −10.9 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.5 8.7 6.8 0.9
Brazil 2.2 3.4 0.0 0.3 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.2 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.1 −0.2
Chile 7.4 6.6 3.2 −0.8 4.5 3.4 2.2 3.9 6.0 5.6 4.6 4.6 3.7 −1.5
China 10.0 9.3 7.8 7.6 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.1
Colombia 2.1 3.4 0.6 −4.2 4.4 1.7 2.5 3.9 5.3 4.7 6.7 6.9 2.7 0.8
Egypt 5.0 5.5 4.0 6.1 5.4 3.5 2.4 3.2 4.1 4.5 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.7
India 7.6 4.1 6.2 7.4 4.0 5.2 3.8 8.4 8.3 9.3 9.4 9.6 5.1 7.7
Indonesia 7.6 4.7 −13.1 0.8 4.9 3.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.6
Malaysia 10.0 7.3 −7.4 6.1 8.9 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.9 6.5 4.7 −1.7
Mexico 5.1 6.8 4.9 3.9 6.6 −0.2 0.8 1.4 4.1 3.2 4.9 3.3 1.5 −6.5
Nigeria 4.3 2.7 1.9 1.1 5.4 3.1 1.6 10.3 10.6 5.4 6.2 6.5 6.0 5.6
Pakistan 4.9 1.0 2.6 3.7 4.3 2.0 3.2 4.9 7.4 7.7 6.2 5.7 1.6 3.6
Peru 2.5 6.9 −0.7 0.9 3.0 0.2 5.0 4.0 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.8 0.9
Philippines 5.9 5.2 −0.6 3.4 6.0 1.8 4.5 4.9 6.4 5.0 5.3 7.1 3.7 1.1
Poland 6.2 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.3 1.2 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.0 1.7
Romania 4.0 −6.1 −4.8 −1.2 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.4 4.2 7.9 6.0 9.4 −8.5
Russia −3.6 1.4 −5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2 −7.9
South Africa 4.3 2.7 0.5 2.4 4.2 2.7 3.7 3.0 4.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 3.7 −1.8
Thailand 5.9 −1.4 −10.5 4.5 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.6 5.2 4.9 2.5 −2.3
Turkey 7.4 7.6 2.3 −3.4 6.8 −5.7 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 −4.7
Ukraine −10.0 −3.0 −1.9 −0.2 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 2.7 7.3 7.9 2.1 −15.1
Vietnam 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.8 8.4 8.2 8.5 6.3 5.3
Source: World Bank.
Table A3
Lending interest rate (%).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Argentina 10.5 9.2 10.6 11.0 11.1 27.7 51.7 19.2 6.8 6.2 8.6 11.1 19.5 15.7
Brazil 93.3 78.2 86.4 80.4 56.8 57.6 62.9 67.1 54.9 55.4 50.8 43.7 47.3 44.7
Chile 17.4 15.7 20.2 12.6 14.8 11.9 7.8 6.2 5.1 6.7 8.0 8.7 13.3 7.3
China 10.1 8.6 6.4 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.6 6.1 7.5 5.3 5.3
Colombia 42.0 34.2 42.2 25.8 18.8 20.7 16.3 15.2 15.1 14.6 12.9 15.4 17.2 13.0
Egypt 15.6 13.8 13.0 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.8 13.5 13.4 13.1 12.6 12.5 12.3 12.0
India 16.0 13.8 13.5 12.5 12.3 12.1 11.9 11.5 10.9 10.8 11.2 13.0 13.3 12.2
Indonesia 19.2 21.8 32.2 27.7 18.5 18.6 18.9 16.9 14.1 14.1 16.0 13.9 13.6 14.5
Malaysia 9.9 10.6 12.1 8.6 7.7 7.1 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.0 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.1
Mexico 36.4 22.1 26.4 23.7 16.9 12.8 8.2 7.0 7.4 9.7 7.5 7.6 8.7 7.1
Nigeria 19.8 17.8 18.2 20.3 21.3 23.4 24.8 20.7 19.2 18.0 16.9 16.9 15.5 18.4
Pakistan 14.5 15.1 16.0 15.0 13.7 13.8 12.0 7.9 7.3 9.1 11.0 11.8 12.9 14.5
Peru 31.5 30.9 32.6 35.1 30.0 25.0 20.8 21.0 24.7 25.5 23.9 22.9 23.7 21.0
Philippines 14.8 16.3 16.8 11.8 10.9 12.4 9.1 9.5 10.1 10.2 9.8 8.7 8.8 8.6
Poland 26.1 25.2 24.5 16.9 20.0 18.4 7.3 7.6 6.8 5.5
Romania 55.1 72.5 55.3 65.6 53.9 45.4 35.4 25.4 25.6 19.6 14.0 13.4 15.0 17.3
Russia 146.8 32.0 41.8 39.7 24.4 17.9 15.7 13.0 11.4 10.7 10.4 10.0 12.2 15.3
South Africa 19.5 20.0 21.8 18.0 14.5 13.8 15.8 15.0 11.3 10.6 11.2 13.2 15.1 11.7
Thailand 13.4 13.7 14.4 9.0 7.8 7.3 6.9 5.9 5.5 5.8 7.4 7.1 7.0 6.0
Turkey 99.2 99.4 79.5 86.1 51.2 78.8 53.7 42.8 29.1 23.8 19.0 20.1
Ukraine 79.9 49.1 54.5 55.0 41.5 32.3 25.4 17.9 17.4 16.2 15.2 13.9 17.5 20.9
V 9
S
R
A
A
B
Gietnam 10.6 9.4
ource: IMF (and central bank or national sources for selected countries).
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